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The purpose of this paper is to present new eeoiiometric evidence on the hypothesis ot a structural break in the stochastic processes generating both U.S. and U.K, sbort-tcrntntiminal interesi rates between 1890:1 and 1934:1, TbroughotU our analysis we utilize the logistic function to model the structtiial break as a transition from an 1(0) to an 1(1) process. Tbis permits scope in assessing the speed as well as the timing of any transition. Section I presenis a brief review of tbe literature in this area. Our statistical analysis follows and has three main seetions. In section 2 we develop new procedures for tesling for a structtiral break from 1(0) lo I(!) and apply them to U,S. and U.K, short-term nominal interest rates. In section 3 we concentrate on dating the structural break in (be U.S, series. In Section 4 we use grid search techniques lo illustrate a fundantental difference between the U.S. and U.K. series regarding what types of transitions (in terms of spceitic dates and speeds) eannot be rejected by likelihood ratio lests. Section 5 concltides the paper.
Our results indicate that, with a fully specified dynamic model, a rapid structtiral break from 1(0) to 1(1) mosl likely occurred in U.S. notriinal interest rates in June 1917. In contrast, for tbe United Kingdotn we fail to tind strong evidenee supporting any particular type of structural change, or of any change a( all. In litet, we tind no I, Bursky ctal, l98X,pat;L-I 130, PAll. NfAVIJOI.I), SILI'IIIA J. I.l^YBOrRNh, \<OH\i\il S()[.MS, .AND M VRK I' VVOilAR ?r/ evidence against ihc proposition thiit the U,K, interest rate scries was difference stationary overthe entire period . One possible explanation (orthis is the interest rale smoothing behavior of the Bank of England during this period documented by Goodfricnd (1988) , Our results indicate that we cannot support the Mankiw, MIroii, and Weil (1987) argument (hat ihc founding of the Federal Reserve System alone represented a new regime, or the propi>sition of Barsky ct al. (1988) who argue that the Fed in some way caused a strucuiral break in U.K. interest rates, l,IJr ['RAr[IRhRl,Vlh\V It has been proposed (bat monthly U.S. shorl-lcrni nominal interest rates underwent a structural break from being level slaliouary. 1(0). with a dominant lirst-order autorcgressive parameter ol' ab.>ut .75. lo approximately difference stationary, l( I), sometime between the end of 1914 and the middle of 1915: see, for example ' Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987) , and Barsky et al. (1988) . Mankiw, Miroi. and Weil (1987) argue thai the change in the stochastic behavior of interest rates was a result of Ihe founding of ihe Federal Reserve System in 1914 and its implementation of interest rate-smootbing policies,-While agreeing that a change in the stochastic behavior of U,S, interest rates took plaee at some time between 1910 and 1920, several authors have questioned the date: ,see, for example, l-ishe and Wohar (1990). Fishe {1991). Angelini (1994). and Kool (1995) , Fishe and Wohar (1990) lind a .structural break in either e;irly 1915 (supporting the Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987) resulls) or in 1912, depending on whether they examine three-month or six-month interest rates. I'ishe (1991) employed weekly dala for the United States, allowing lor mullip ie structural breaks over the sample 1890 to 1933, Break points were reported in .lanuary 1908 {a period just following the October 1907 linancial crisis), in June 1917 Ul date associated with Federal Reserve Amendments tbal signifieanlly increased the Fed"s operating eapability). and in January 1930 , Kool (1995 employs a recursive method based on Bayesian learning and argues that the results of previous switching regression (echniques allempting lo date the slruclural cbange in interest rates are nol robust. His esiimation method yields a switeh to nonstalionarity in late 1917, Angelini reexamines the work of Mankiw, Miron and Weil (1987) and Fishe and Wobar (1990) and concludes that their results are not robust (o sample periods and thai there is no evidence of sIrueUiral change in 1914, While the majorily of authors believe ihat when (he structural change in U.S. interest rates did occur, it oeetirred quite rapidly |for example. Mimkiw, (bund it highly probable Ihat the structural break in US. interesl rates look less (han a year to be fully complete|. otber arguments have been proposed regarding the speed of the adjustment to a new regime following the loundin" of the Fed. Willis (1923) and Wicker (1966) note Ibat Ihe Fed was not very aetivt? in its lirM tiniL Ml Julv l'JI4aiullhi.-bankso|x-iic.l tor husiiic-ss nii Novcmlvr Id, I<)I4. early years, with most of ils efforts during the years 1914-1916 being focused on internal t)rgani/ation. Aficr this initial period however the Fed was able to concentrate more rest)urces on their interest rate policy that ct)nseqiiently affected the stochastic behavior of interest rates. RicHcr (1930) and Kool (1995) point out that the Fed did not provide large amounts of liquidily to the economy until after 1917 when war financing became an important concern.
In addition to questions over the timing and speed of the structural change, various alternative arguments have also been presented lo explain the reason for the structural change. For example while Pishe and Wohar (1990) support Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987) and Barsky et al. (1988) with respect to the hehavior of the U.S. three-month interest rale/ they suggest that it was not the founding of the Fed that changed the behavior of interest rates, but instead ihc reopening of the U.S. bond and stock markets in November and December of 1914. Moreover, Angelini (1994) notes that during World War 1 the New York money markci was strongly subjected to the regulation and control of the Money Market Coinniittec. Ftirther. throughout this period major reforms were passed, that according to some writers of the time greatly affected the functioning of the money market and may have resulted in ;i permanent change in how this market operated and Itinctioned. Clark (I9S6) ptits forward the proposition that the changing behavior of interest rates and inliation was a worldwide phenomenon, resulting from the suspension of the gold standard, beginning in 1914 and ending by September 1917. The World War 1 suspension of the gold standard was not abrupt, but piecemeal. While the war forced most of the European nations off the gold standard, in the United States it was nominally maintained and it was not tintil September 1917 that the government began to constrain gold exports in an effort to restrict gold otitflows. From May 1919 through March 192(1 infUttionary pressures led to the resumption of gold outflows (see Wicker 1966) . Then as gold reserves approached mininitim rcqtiirenients, the Fed increased the discount rate in -lanuary 1920 to 6 percent. Gold inflows followed and in June 1920 the full gold standard was resumed, until 1933 when fhe United States went off ihc gold standard.
Although il appears quiic plausible ihat the establishment of a new institution such as the Federal Reserve at the end of 1914 could have IUKI a strong and immediate effect on market conditions in the United States, it seems very unlikely fhat the infroducfion of fhe Fed would have been fhe catalyst for strucfural change around the world. Clark (1986) proposes that fhe structtiral change in interest rafe behavior also fook place in European cotinfries where cenfral hanks had already been in operation for tnany years. For example, the Bank of England was established in 1694. Barsky ef ai. (1988) also find a change in the behavior of U.K. interest rates around the same time as their postulafed change in the behavior of U.S. itiferest rates, and while they acknowledge thaf fhe U.S. economy was not sufficienfly dominant to have altered worldwide interest rates, thev argue ajiainst Clark (I9S6) that II was the dissolution of tbe gold Standard thai ciuisL-d this change. Tbey present a tbcorelical nK>dc] to support tbeir argument Ibat tbe founding of the I'ed was lhc ultimate cause of tbe worldwide cbange in interest rale bebavior bccau.se il -niarked lhc beginning of a new era in wbich all major eounlries had a central bank."""B arro (I9H9) and Kool (1995) suggesi a more attructivc expianalion for the structural cbange in U.S. and U.K, interest rales, as retlcciing tbe beginning of interest rate targeting. Barro (1989) attributes Ihe regime cbange in the United States to tbe fact thai the central bank had an ohjeclivc of smoothing interest rales aroutid a random walk target to stabilize Ihe economy at some point following the founding of the Fed. It bas been argued by Kool (1995) thai interest rate targeting in the United Slates and tbe United Kingdom began at differenl times, albeii for lhc same reason, namely, the financing of military spending through government borrowing at low interest rates. Kool (1995) Many of tbe above cited studies suggesi reasonable argtmienls for a strucltiral break occurring in U.S. inicresl rates sometime during 1917, rather than 1914. Our subsequent empirical analysis will examine this issue. Tbe dala for our empirical analysis are taken from the sef used by Barsky el ul. (1988) and Mankiw. Miron, and Weil (1987) . Tbe U.S. dala series consists of 529 monthly observations on (be threemonth lime loan rale available al New York Cily banks, taken from the Naiionai Monetary Commission Fimtncial Review, updated tising the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. Tbe U.K. series consists of 529 monibly obscrvalions on the threemonth rate on hankers" bills available in London aiid laken from tbe Fconomist. This is the open market rate o\' bankers" bills, nol to be confused with the Bank of England's discounl rale, known as tbe bank rale, fisbe and Wohar (1990), among olbers, qttcstion the rcliabiliiy of (his dala series and note a number of problems with the U.S. monthly dala sel. We iberefore follow ibeir siratL-gy of analyzing primarily weekly data for the United States, a series of 1.305 observations beginning in 1909. For completeness, we also reporl tindings for nionlbly data as well. ' Consider a titne series of inieresi rates modeled as
where c, are independcnl, identically distribulcti {IID} deviates, and ,S;(y,T) is the logistic function based on a sample of si/e 7', 4. BarsKy L-I al. IMSS, pai^c I 12?. Granger and Terasvirta (1993) and Lin and Terasivirta (1994) . though the te.st for transition from 1(0) to I( 1), developed in this section, is new. In the tirst-order autoregressivc framework of (i), if the final state is differeneestationarity. about which there seems little dispute in the literature, then [i, + pT ^ '-This constraint will be imposed in our subsequent analysis. Level stationarity in tbe initial state implies lp,|< 1, Assuming p, + p2 = '' then (I) can be rewritten as (V, -S,(Y.T)vv_|) = a, + a2S,(y,x) + P|(>v-i " S,Ci,i)y, .,) + e, .
\-oi-
To test the null hypothesis that y, is I( I) throughout against a transition in y, from 1(0) to 1(1) with drift, the relevant hypotheses are //,,:P, = I,//, :|5, < I.
As there is little reason to suspect long-term drift in the later, difference stationary, period, we also consider the same test, but constraining the drift to be zero, that is, for a transition from a stationary first-order autoregression with non/ero tnean to a random walk with no drift. In this ease a, + a^ = 0 so that model (2) becomes
The null and alternative hypotheses involving p, are as above. The appropriate test of//" versus H^ in both models is based on the /-statistic for testing p] = 1; that is.
where |5| is the (nonlinear) least sqtiares estimator of [i, in (2) or (3), 'fo obtain critical values for these test statistics, we sintulaled tinder (be null bypothesis from ibc random walk model witb e, generated as ///.) N(O,I), Models (2) and (3) were fitted lo this process by nonliitear least squares (NLS), earc being taken to ensure that global ratber than local minima were found tbrough tbe use of a grid of starting valties (or i. Because models (2) and (3) are linear in the a and [i parameters, when estimating, following Leybourne. Newbold and Vougas (1998). we are able to speed tip the convergence of the optimization algorithm by concentrating the sum of squares funetion with respect to (bcse parameters. Thus tiie NLS estimation probient reduces to ntinimi/ing the sum of squares function with respect to the (wo parameters y and f. Given the greater volatility in the early part of tbese interest rate series compared to tbe postbreak years, particularly for the United States, we also simulated critical values assuming heteroskedastieity under the null hypothesis. Specifically these eritieal values were simulated under the Ttull bypothesis IVom random walk series of I,3().S observations, witb variaticeof C; in the first 34 percent of the satnple tbree times that in the linal 66 percent of" the sample, (Our analysis suggests that for tbe U,S. weekly series the most likely abrupt break is 34 pereent of tbe way tbnuigh, with residtial variances approximately of ratio 3:1.) Of course, these critical values are only directly relevant lor the model estimated tor these data, so in Table I we prcseiu btith sels of critical values at tbe 0.10. 0.05, and 0.01 signilicanee levels for bolh the tests (uneonstrained dritt and drift constrained to zero), calctilated trom tivc thousand replications.'' When calculating the iest statistics for eacb inicrest rate series, lathcr than wt>rk-ing witb (be raw data, we corrected for any potential dynamic misspecilication in the model (2) or (3) by application of nn atitoregressive tiller to the dat;i prior to the modeling, Tbe tilter we tised involved tirst estimating by ordinary least squares the autoregression (l. For iliL' Nt,S csiint[iiio[i here ami thrnughotii otir Mjuilysis we ciiiplovL'tl UK' OPTMtJM stitinitiltnc lihntry iil" (i,'\tl,SS ,^,1, The cfilical vLtltics itiv \ii-ltiiilly idciiliL'al lot SLTIOS ol" ^2'-) nuinlhly ;iiut !.3()5 weekly obsfr\'ali(>ns. We also simtilalcd iniio\'alioiis frniii a liea\ y-laileJ ilislrihtiliiin, SlLideiil's / wilti 5 dejitre^ III' I'lccdom. Iliis had [i iiL-ghgitilo inipaci on ihc criiiLLiI \;ilttL-s. Stihsct|ticnil> \so ailovvoil lor dynamics by inlntduciiig lags. We lotiiid thai Ihis elahoraiioii nl ihc irsi has only a niiidest impact on Ihc critical values.
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We tben defined v, -X ^i, '-^^ ^'"'' ^^^ries to be modeled and estimated the models (2) and (3) using tbe filtered data _v, in place of y,.^ Treating the auttjcorrelation dynamics in this way ensures that tbe asymptotic null distribution of the test statistic is unchanged. Moreover, since nuisance parameters are easily eliminated through ordinary least squares estimation of tbe autoregression in first differences, only modest additional computation is involved in sitnulations, tbrough which we were able to verify tbat the critical values of Table I remain appropriate for sample sizes of interest. Table 2 provides tbe calculated test statistics and estimated parameters for each transition model.
Comparing Table 2 with Table I , for monthly U.S. short-term nominal interest rates over the period 1890:1 to 1934:1. using the critical values simulated under the assumption of heteroskedastic error terms, we can reject the null of no transition from 1(0) to 1( 1) for all of our models at tbe 5 percent level of significance. This is so irrespective of whether or not we incorporate dummy variables in the model for points of data irregularity.^ Even stronger rejections are obtained, at the I percent significance level, wben U.S, weekly data beginning in 1909 are used. Note, however, that irrespective of wbicb critical values are used, for U.K, monthly short-term nomina! interest rates over the period 1890:1 to 1934:1. unequivocally we cannot rejcct the Kl) null hypothesis. Thus, we find, along witb previous authors, very strong evidence of transition from level stationarity to difference stationarity for ibe United States. However, evidence for such a transition in the U.K, interest rate series is not significant, even at tbe 10 percent level, so that our analysis fails to reveal strong 7, For Ihc U,S, weekly, U,.S, monthly, and the U,K, monllily series, using Ihe general to specitic testin" methodology at the 10 pereent level ol" signiikanee we identilied k -5. k = 211, and k • 24. respeetiCeiv Hor ihe U S montlilv series we also considered the possibility of elaborating our model by incoiporatine 0-1 dummv variables lor tbe moiubs l')()7:l 1, 1907:12, and I9O8;1. which were severely allected by ibc financial aash of 1907, 1 ,ike Fishe and Wohar (1990) and Fishe (1991) we tind ibat seasonal dummy variables takiri!! Ihe same value across Ibc sample bave no mipacl on tbe location or speed of tbe sirucitiral breaks found asing our models. For Ihis reason we present results excluding seasona dummies We also experimented wiib seasonal dummy variables Ibal look dillercni values in tbe early and lale periods in tbe manner of Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (I9S7), However tbis metbodology involves an arbitrary decision as to wbat subsamples should be used to calculate Ibc dummy variables, and none ot these lypes of models olTer an inerease in explanatory power over models excludmg seasonal dummy variables but including addilional stalistieally signitieanl dynamics.
8 For calculalion of Ihe test slalislic wiib U.S, monlbly data, rbe relevant transition models were estimated witb dummy variables included lor observations 19117:11,1907:12, and 1908 :1, tbese observalions being severely affeeied by the linaneial crasb of 1907, It is widely acknowledged tbal some oI Ihe U,S, monthly data'is subject lo heing contaminaled witb measurement ernir. For certain monlbs m Ihe years 1901 Ihe years r907, 1910 Ihe years . and 1918 . usury laws imposed a ceiling on the reported interest rales meanmg tbat Ibc rates reporicd in ihesc vears were' nol llic true market elearing interesl rates. Wbile we report results meludini; only dummy variables for observations 1907:11,1907:12, and 1908: 1. uicorporatuig dummy variables int(i our models lor observaiions wiib measuremeni error did not alter Ibc timing of the cstimaled transition, or tbe general conclusions of sialistical support for a break of tbis type m ibc U,S series-or tbe linding of no sucb break in tbe U,K, series, Tbis is consisleni witb Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1990) In section 2 our tests fail lo find sfning support fot" the hypothesis that a .structural change from 1(0) to 1(1) occurred at ali in U.K. Inleresi rates over the period y. An aildiiional eheek on ihe validity of our findings tor ilie L',K. seiies was earricd oul by estimating our iiiodeK with Ihe exponeiii in the logistic funetion reversed. In ihis ease our restriction [3, I |i, 1 luiccs the model to be l( 1) at the start n!' the series and our standard lest heciitucs one of Ihe null hypdtlicsis that the model remains at l( I) againsi an aliernative hypoihesis thai ai sotiie point there is a transition to 1(0). riiis variaiii revealed no additi(iiiai statistical evidence against ilic l( 11 null hypothesis for ihc U,K. series.
1890:1-1934:1. In this section of our empirical analysis we concentrate on ihe U.S. series. Here and in the following section, we report results on U.S, weekly data, beginning in 1909. In fact, very similar results were found for U,S. monthly data over the period 1890:1 -1934:1. A detailed analysis of tbis montbly series is given by Sollis (1999) .
To determine tbe timing and speed at which tbe structural change in U.S. shortterm nominal interest rates occurred, we used the approacb outlined in section 2, estimating models with and without any constraints on the drift a, + a, in (1) and (2). Tbe model specifications are
for unconstrained drift, and for drift constrained to be (),
with, as in tbe previous section, ^ = 5 in both models. In each case, tben, tbe constraint p, + p2 = I isimposedon(l), inline with the evidence of lbe previous section of a transition from 1(0) to 1(1). Equations (4) and (5) provide a sligbtly different approacb here, wbere tbe empbasis is on estimation rather than testing (as was tbe case in section 2), to the incorporation of dynamics into (2) and (3). For tbe present purposes, it is convenient to express tbe model lo be estimated as a single equation, using tbe raw, ratber tban the transformed, data. Tbe results obtained in this section are, as we shall see, entirely compatible with tbose of tbe previous section. Figure I sbows the estimated transition, from a nonlinear least squares fit for the constrained drift model. [Virtually identical results were obtained for tbe unconstrained model (4)]. The estimated transition is virtually instantaneous, occurring in June 1917. As reported in SoUis (1999) a similar analysis of montbly data frotn 1890:1-1934:1 also generates a best estimate of an altnost instantaneous transition in June 1917. The only apparent difference of substance between results for the two data sets is tbat while Sollis reports an estimate of 0.74 for tbe dominant autoregressive paratneter in tbe pretransition period, as can be seen from Figure I tbe corresponding value for the bigher frequency data is 0.93. Because 0.93^ -= 0.75, these estimates from weekly and monthly data are certainly not incompatible. Wbile our results for weekly data and for monthly data covering a longer time period are in agreement, tbey differ from those of Mankiw, Miron, and Wei! (1987) , wbo also used a logistic switching model, estimating a transition, using monthly data, that is essentially completed between December 1914 and June 1915. We can acbieve the same results for tbose data by dropping the dynamics-that is, the tertns in lagged firsl differences in (4), It is the inclusion of these terms, tben, that accounts for the differences in our point estimates and those of Mankiw, Miron, and Weil. However, it must 191C 1912 191C 1914 191C 1916 191C t9t6 1620 191C 1J2 !K4 1K6 IKS 1930 191C 1932 191C 1934 years Vvi. I, CilohLiI Maximniii IVaiisition. Constrained Drift Model: t.l,S, Weekly i^ata be stressed that the analysis of this secticMi does not statisticaily excltide an earlier transition us a possibility. The estimated transitions reported in this scctioti are tu>nlinear least squares point estimates. In Figure 1 we teport as our best estiinale ;t very rapid Iransiiion in tnid-1917. However, as yet we have not attached uncertainty measures to this estimate, which does not. for exampic, exclude on statistical grounds the possibility of an earlier or less rapid transition, fhis issue is explored in the following section.
4, A C;R1D SI'ARCH ANALYSIS OK POTION IIAL PARAMIiTfiR I RANSITIONS
In our final empirical sectioti we tnake a more detailed cotiipari.son of the U.S. and U,K, interest rate series, from the perspective of estimating parameter transition,s to capture potential struclurai changes from 1(0) io 1(1), Specifically, we fit transition models fo both scries atid determitie the set of parameter values (y.x)-that is, speed of transition and transition tnidpoint-that cannot he excluded by likelihood ratio tests. Here we report resulLs for the U.S. weekly series beginning in 1909."' In section 2 we noted ihe lack of strong evidence of any such transition for the U,K, series. Nevertheless, failure to reject a null hypothesis (of no transition) does not necessarily conslitutc sirong evidetice in favor of that hypothesis, so a transition tiiodel is estimated for the LJ.K, data. In section 3 we noted that our best estimate for the U,S.
Id, Hov'.ovei. Sollis 11999) liiids comparable coiiclitsidiis tor the U.S, monthly scries over the whole period 189(1 1934, In particular, tho sharp distinctiun in inference ahuui the L'.S. and IJ,K, interest rate time series that will he reported in this si,-i.tiiin hdlds, whichcM^T iif the two U,S, series is analv/ed. series is a very rapid transition in June 1917, but it is important to assess what other possibilities cannot be excluded on statistical grounds.
Working with our tnost general model, given by equation (2), we augment to explicitly take account of higher-order autocorrelations giving model (4), which is tben estitnated by nonlinear least squares. As before, in that model we set k = 5 tor the U.S. weekly series and k = 24 for the U.K. tiiontbly series. Tben for each series we calculate the sum of squared errors (SSE) over a grid allowing y to range from .005 to 5 in steps of .005 and x front. 1 to .9 in steps of ,01, tninimizing SSE, or equivalently maximizing the Gaussian likelihood, for the remaining parameters in the model at each point on the grid. Note that increasing the range of y beyond 5 leads to no information gain because at tbis stage the iransition is already virtually instantaneous.
Defining tbe natural log of the likelihood function at the global maximum over (y,x) as /^|(y|,i:|) and the log of the maximized likelihood function at any other point (yy,Xi,) as /:Q(yo,Xi|), then at each point in our grid search we obtain a different L^ for each different y,T combination. Assuming that / = 2{L^ -L,,) has a chi-squared distribution with 2 degrees of freedom under (y,!) = (y,,,Xo), the set of all y,x combinations that cannot be rejected at tbe 5 percent significance level can be obtained by locating the y,T values such that / < 5.99. Tbese sets are graphed as Ftgure 2, witb the dashed and solid lines indicating the computed sets lor tbe U.K. and U.S. series, respectively. Rather than graph the transition speed y (that has little intuitive interpretation) against x, we convert y into the approximate time tbat it takes for 90 percent of the transition process to be completed (45 percent eitber side of the midpoint T). using for monthly (weekly) data the approximate conversion formula 90 percent transition in montbs (weeks) -(6/y). This approximation appears to work well over tbe range of values considered here.
From Figure 2 . for the U.S. short term nominal interest rate, the acceptable transition midpoints x range from October 1914 to January 1918. wbile in terms of the transition speed, we can accept speeds from instantaneous to 7.7 years for 90 percent of the transition to be completed. Yet it can be seen on the same graph that for tbe United Kingdom we can accept midpoints earlier than 1909, and eitber very fast transitions or extremely slow transitions with 90 pereent of the transition taking one hundred years. This huge range of acceptable parameter combinations for the United Kingdom is compatible with the analysis of section 2, that suggested only weak evidence for any transition in this series.
As an aid to interpreting Figure 2 , in Figures 3 and 4 we plot the estimated beta transition (^ <1 to 1) that maximizes the likelihood function, and for comparison the transition of p, < 1 to I that is consistent with a y at the highest point of the aet! For example with our tnonlhly data, when 7 = ,23. 90 perceni complclinn ocetirs in two years (twenty-four months), when y = 5. 9() percent completion occurs in 1 month. Our formula gives that tor these Y values 90 percent of completion occurred in 24 months and I -2 months, respectively, Ot eourse . we atlow in these calculations tor the higher frequency of the U,S, data, and report tor comparabthty niitriher of years lor 90 percent completion of transitton. To verify ihat our miidel was approprtate over the whole sample span, we calculated residual autocorrelations for the periods before and after our best esttmates of the transition midpoints, 'f hese were small, giving no evidence ol serious misspeeiiicatton o! the model for the complete data sets. 191C 191? 19H 1916 !9ia 192C 1922 ISIO 1S12 ISM 1916 ISIfl t920 1922 192* 1928 tS28 193D 1932 years Fi(i, 4. Global Miiximum Transition and Slowest Acceptable Transition: U.K. Monthly Dala ceptance set (a slower transition), but with the same x value as for the transition that maximizes the likelihood function. From Figure 3 , it can be seen that the transition that generates the maximum value of the likelihood function for the U.S. series is virtually instantaneous, starting from June 1917. Alternatively the bulk of the transition consistent wilh a y from the edge of the acceptable y,T set but with the same tnidpoint (the slowest iransition we can accept), lakes place between 1914 and 1921. As shown in Figure 4 , for the United Kingdom, the transition that maxitnizes the value of the likelihood function again occurs quickly, in this case in June 1915. The slowest transition we cannot reject (with the same midpoint) is simply an upwardsloping line that in fact starts from .88 in 1890. reaches .91 by 1909, and .96 by the linal observation. It can be seen that for the U.K. series we cannot reject an extretnely slow iransition that is nol fully completed within the sample.
Clearly in terms of estimating structural change in the form of parameter transitions, the U.S. and U.K. short-term interest rate series are fundamentally different. While at the 5 percent level of significance for ihe U.S. we cannot reject parameter transitions with midpoints between 1914:10 and 1918:1, this period being a good candidate for a ''transitional period" in terms of the historical evidence discussed in Ihe introduction, iransitions that are extremely slow can be rejected. For the United Kingdom at the 5 percent level of significance there is a much wider range of tnidpoinls that cannot be rejected and in terms of transitional speed we cannot reject the slowest feasible transition, or the fastest. Thus for the U.K. series if a transition is estimated in spite of the test outcomes of section 2, then our statistically acceptable results tell us altnost any type of break might have occurred^we cannot find strong support for any specific type of break, and the hypothesis of no break is in this sense further supported.
